Advocacy campaigns opposing the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) illustrate that the dynamics of networked activism have symbolic as well as structural aspects, with implications for scholars and activists who have focused on the coordination possibilities of networks. This paper analyses the creation and movement of discourses of 'network exceptionalism' between advocates, online culture and news media. Networks operate functionally to disseminate ideas and link together people participating in social action (e.g. by embedding aspects of discourse in memes, which then propagate ideas swiftly), but also symbolically, inflecting discourses towards a focus on the exceptionaland essential -qualities of the internet. These discourses embed fears about the fragility and indispensability of the internet, as well as thrilling and threatening elements like Anonymous. They are carried by memes that link the structural dynamics of networked activism to the discourses of illness, threat and utility, and gain different inflections through the European campaigns to oppose ACTA. These discourses not only create spaces for discussing and expanding upon the value of the internet to communication rights, but also leave room for interpretations that may undermine these advocacy projects.
Introduction
In January 2012, a black banner appeared on Wikipedia, inviting readers to 'Imagine a world without Free Knowledge' and warning 'the US Congress is considering legislation that could fatally damage the free and open internet ' (Wikipedia, 18 January 2012) . This 'blackout' was extensively covered in the media, and thousands of individuals contacted their elected representatives meaning that the legislation -the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the related Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) -were not passed. Later that same year, the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a treaty covering both intellectual property and counterfeiting, failed to be ratified by the European Commission, after a similarly high level of public participation. This paper identifies how these actions expanded public participation in information policy issues by analysing discourses developed between advocates and the media. Departing from analysis that primarily concerns the structural potential for networked organizing, it focuses on the symbolic significance of networked processes. This has implications for activism and scholarship that seek to position the internet at the centre of a transformation in activist practice away from control of media and towards networked practices. Focusing on the ways that discourse circulates within and connects online activism, conventional activism and mass media coverage in the opposition to SOPA and ACTA, the paper highlights the continuing role for the popular press in developing and carrying discourses, in dialectic with social media. To inspire further research into the intersection of structural and symbolic aspects of networked activism on information policy, it identifies how discourses of 'network exceptionalism' can be leveraged in various directions both towards and away from greater democratization of communications. In the contemporary climate of intensive surveillance of digital communications, the assumption that 'network exceptionalism' is positive or democratic may need to be re-examined.
Background: digital rights legislation and networks of activism SOPA, PIPA and 2010's COICA: Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act, intended to curb international infringement of US-based intellectual property rights by increasing the liability of website operators and internet service providers. SOPA and PIPA proposed 'requiring US search engines, advertising networks and other providers to withhold their services' in relation to websites hosting suspicious content (Schmitz, 2013) . However, these bills were also perceived as chilling online speech, inspiring advocacy from digital rights movements focused on democratizing digital communications environments, including hardware, software, and connection protocols (see Postigo, 2012) . The ways that communication rights movements have linked different forms of activism often draws on such physical features as detailed by Postigo as well as intersections with other forms of practice including physical protest (Miekle, 2002) . These intersections are significant but slightly outside of the scope of this paper, which seeks to reiterate the significance -and ambivalence -of the ways networks, especially those supporting activism, are viewed as exceptional.
The debate around SOPA established different ways for digital rights movements to link into expectations of broader participation in policy-making related to digital rights, especially including the possibility for more discursive citizen participation in policy-making (Bridy, 2012) . Yoder (2012) points out the high level of participation in discussions around SOPA compared to the expected policy influence from industry lobbying, including the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and Record Industry Association of America (RIAA) as supporters, and Google as opponent.
SOPA, unlike ACTA, provided scope for civic participation in policy-making because information was more easily accessible (see Bridy, 2012) . Information on ACTA, including the aspects of the treaty related to digital communications, was difficult to attain until it was leaked in 2009. Its negotiation took place almost completely in secret, bypassing more representative bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). By early 2012, ACTA had been ratified by 22 countries and final ratification by the European Union was pending. Yet as the ratification vote approached, mass protests opposing ACTA emerged across Europe, including significant street protests in Germany, Poland and the Netherlands (Lee, 2012) and coordinated actions led by digital rights organizations encouraging individuals to contact their elected Member of the European Parliament. A petition with signatures of 2.8 million European citizens opposing the bill was delivered to the parliament. The treaty was defeated in preliminary votes on 21 June 2012 and in a final vote on 4 July 2012. The opposition to ACTA engaged a long tradition of digital rights activism in Europe, but its campaign also adopted discourses produced about network exceptionalism as part of anti-SOPA campaigns, in a process that challenges some of the existing theories of mediated action.
Theories of mediated action: protest and policy formation
The literature on public participation in policy issues includes theories of social movements that consider actions in response to political opportunity, theories that concentrate on the symbolic power of the media to frame or set political agendas, and theories of network power and action that focus on the social organization and structural capacity of networks. Structural theories concentrate on the formation of political opportunity or the role of media in setting and communicating frames that influence policy, while dialectic and dialogic theories examine the interplay of communicative power with networked social dynamics. Individually, these theories fail to entirely explain the links between SOPA and ACTA activism, but brought together through a focus on discourse, they can explain how activism employs networks in symbolic as well as structural ways.
Social movements and opportunity structures Studies of social movements are interested in how mass media permit activists to communicate their messages. Social movement studies defines political 'opportunity structures' as the 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure' (Tarrow, 1994, p. 85) . These are structural elements outside of individual experience. While these are often considered in terms of national and international policy opportunities, they are also shifted by the perceived opportunities of global networks of participation. Konieczny (2014) argues, in a study of Wikipedia editors opposing SOPA, that free culture actors organizing worldwide and in the United States responded to a 'nested' political opportunity structure. This included both an international political opportunity structure highlighted by international discussions about the threat that SOPA posed to Wikipedia, as well as a national political opportunity structure that included the ability of Wikipedia editors to directly contact their own political representatives. For Wikipedia editors with US nationality, SOPA was a domestic policy issue, while for international editors, it was a global issue of free access to information. Thus, free culture activism is transnational, so we must carefully consider the relationship between the national and the global in analysis of transnational digital rights movements. However, Koniecnzy's study focuses only on the Wikipedia action, overlooking the broader public mobilization that was key to the overturning of SOPA, and which depended also on the circulation and appropriation of discourse.
Symbolic power: agenda setting and framing One direction for the study of symbolic power in activism is to identify the opportunities for social movement actors to shape messages that are then presented in the media (Snow & Benford, 1992) , as well as the role of mainstream media in legitimating demands and capturing attention (Tufekci, 2013) . This legitimation has been shifting as networked social relations alter the media ecology. Gamson and Wolfsfeld argue that social movements 'need news media for three major purposes: mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement ' (1993, p. 116) . In the classic theory of framing, these three actions depend on mass media having greater power to control attention, with social media actors left with little control over the 'stories' (Benford & Snow, 2000) and subject to the ideological power of the media (Gitlin, 1980 ). Yet social media shifts control of representation. Tufekci (2013) notes that participatory media allows social movement actors to now capture attention through the use of multiple media channels, lessening the need for 'one prize broadcast that can command mass attention in the same manner as in the era of broadcast dominance' (Tufekci, 2013, p. 856) . Instead, peer-to-peer networks and network structures begin to dominate, depending on 'digital social media and its affordances of easy copying, sharing, and distributing among interconnected peer networks' (p. 855).
Structures of networked relationship
Tufecki sees the transformation of social movements as resulting in part from the structural aspects of networked social movements, which leaves aside questions of whether networks change how ideas get made, rather than how they get shared. Similarly, Gonzalez-Bailon, Borge-Holthoefer, and Moreno (2013) identify how new media has changed the costs of mobilization and coordination for activists. Examining the diffusion of protest activities related to the Arab Spring via Twitter hashtags, they identify a lowered cost for moving information transnationally. This work notes that transnational opportunities shift with the advent of networks, but leaves open the question about what kinds of messages are created and shared.
Benkler, Roberts, Faris, Solow-Niederman, and Etling (2013) employ a similar approach to the SOPA case, focusing on the peer-to-peer sharing of information. Their data-driven approach maps the links between online sources, identifying connections between social media sites and news media in discussions of COICA, SOPA and ACTA between 2010 and 2013. Their study identifies the media sources that received the greatest number of in-links, which they claim allows them to identify the development and movement of controversies over time. This use of linking behaviour to represent significance dedicates high value to the form of networked communication, but does not consider in detail the discourses constructed within the content shared and linked. Benkler's work is also limited to the US context, raising questions about how networked dynamics of information sharing are associated with advocacy about digital rights issues across national boundaries -and within networks themselves.
Networks as platform: civil disobedience
Networks not only permit information sharing among activists, but they also support forms of civil disobedience: Anonymous, the loose collective of internet users known for employing tactics such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in response to perceived threats to free speech and autonomy of the internet. DDoS attacks function by overwhelming web servers with requests. The use of these tactics has a long history in digital rights activism, often split between using these technical tactics as a means to gain media attention and undertaking 'serious hacktivism' by building tools for encrypted communication (Bodó, 2014; Sauter, 2013) .
The anti-SOPA 'blackout' was not itself a DDoS, and nor was it a particularly sophisticated technical act: it was still possible to access many of the 'blacked out' websites via proxy servers. In this sense, this action was perhaps more in line with historical hacktivist actions like those of the Electronic Disturbance Theatre, who claimed that the purpose of a DDOS was to draw popular attention to an issue and to generate public debate but also to directly engage with the target in a form of direct action. The DDOS was viewed as an auxiliary political act, a way to 'leave one's computer protesting at home and then hit the streets to do the same. (Dominguez, 2009 (Dominguez, , p. 1810 Sauter, 2013, p. 988) However, recent use of DDoS by Anonymous has not developed this parallel with physical protest, instead linking DDoS with other technical tactics such as 'site invasion' or swamping of comment boards (Coleman, 2011) and the creation of online videos and manifestos (Sauter, 2013) . The symbolic impact of Anonymous comes from the legal uncertainty around DDoS (Sauter, 2013) , which has been exacerbated by recent arrests of Anons participating in DDoS and site invasions (Bodó, 2014) . For the purposes of this argument, it is worth focusing on how Anonymous actions (and other technical activism) operate symbolically to generate a sense of possibility and (legal) threat that is linked both to the 'peculiar powers that cyberspace creates' (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, p. 116) and to the media visibility of internet-related concerns.
As this section has outlined, structural conditions for garnering attention, sharing information or enacting civil disobedience shift under networked conditions. The network promises an alternative paradigm for engagement -and this promise is highlighted not only in the manner of sharing information but also in the discourses produced in relation to networked protest. These discourses configure the space of possibility for activist actions. Examining these discourses as they are produced in relation to activist activities that have policy outcomes, such as SOPA and ACTA, makes it possible not only to identify how the symbolic power of mass media shifts in relation to participatory media structures, but also how the discourses move along with them, creating spaces for engagement with policy ideas.
Symbolic power and participation in policy-making
Networked relationships do not just create structural possibilities, but they also create discursive spaces for participation in policy-making activities. Levine (2012) and Bridy (2012) observe participation in the negotiation of SOPA and ACTA. Legislative space created for participation in SOPA was open enough to invite participation:
in sharp contrast to deliberations over ACTA, congressional deliberations over SOPA/PIPA were marked by a much more open flow of information between policymakers and the public. This was due in large part to the free availability of the primary documents and an interest in their contents that propagated virally across the Internet. (Bridy, 2012, p. 158) Levine sees the openness of the deliberative space as related to accessibility of information by citizen publics (2012), whereas Bridy stresses the importance of information flows from citizens to policy-makers, claiming a particular significance for the SOPA protests that encouraged citizens to contact their elected representatives. This is in line with what Gangadharan (2013a) positions as a deliberative model for participation in policy-making: 'a deliberative alternative, which focuses on the collective formation of ideas, concerns, or proposals of individuals and communities affected by communication regulation' (p. 1). Activism facilitated over the internet and in relation to communications policy has a dual character: it employs features of participatory and networked information sharing and uses these to develop discourses that support the internet as a site for free expression. Bridy characterizes this as a 'multi-vocal chorus of input from the Internet -both on behalf of the Internet and by means of the Internet' (p. 163).
The capacity for networked coordination and the availability of information over the network thus create space for deliberative policy-making. However, as significant as the network structures that facilitate this mode of communicative action may be, they are also in dialectic with the mass media, whose symbolic power to frame and represent remains important. Even in Bridy's defence of the dialogic mode of policy-making, evidence for civic action comprised media reports. In a space of discursive policy-making, where language 'reproduces hierarchies of political competence between experts and nonexperts' (Mochnacki, 2013, p. 529 ) the media can establish and reposition these hierarchies. The participatory space for participation in policy discourse is thus constructed by and through the creation of activist networks, but also re-presented in media narratives about this activism.
The next section examines the development and movement of discourses of 'network exceptionalism' between digital rights activists, online information sources and press reports of the SOPA and ACTA opposition. This discourse has structural and symbolic aspects, expressing normative claims made about the capacity of the internet to promote free expression, as well as structural claims about the value of the internet for networked protest. By tracking the discourse alongside the operation of the networked action (as mapped by Benkler et al. in the case of SOPA, and as described by activists in the case of ACTA), we can understand how the dialectic relationships between advocates, the press and policy-makers unfold. We can also push past the limits of previous work that examined only one part of this dialectic, opening up opportunities for scholars to go further to examine the relationship between the structural and symbolic potential of networks.
Methods: discursive approaches
The paper employs what Streeter, following Foucault, identifies as 'discursive practices … intertwined habits of talk and action, patterns which are rendered significant in their consequences, as in their effects ' (2013, p. 489) . This approach focuses on language and the symbolic in policymaking: 'terms, phrases, statements and arguments -not just as tools, nor as things that can be defined more or less precisely, but as significant moments in an ongoing flow of human action' (Streeter, 2013, p. 490) . From this perspective, struggles over meaning reveal the negotiation of the symbolic power that underpins policy-making, made visible in the negotiations around the use of certain discourses (Dunbar-Hester, 2013) , their movement into different interpretive communities (Streeter, 1996) and the ways that discourses are translated differently by different publics engaged in policy processes (Gangadharan, 2013b) . This paper contributes to this discussion of discursive tensions in policy-making by examining how the discourse of network exceptionalism operates as it moves among networked actors via online information sharing, the mass media and representatives of activist organizations.
The analysis includes news articles indexed by LexisNexis, published in the United States between 20 December 2011 and 20 February 2012 for SOPA-related material (of a total of 600 results, 200 articles, sampled sequentially, were read and coded thematically in order to identify themes for subsequent discourse analysis), and articles published in English in European newspapers between 1 January 2012 and 1 March 2012 for ACTA-related material (all 80 articles resulting from this search were thematically coded before discourse analysis). It focuses on how specific discourses are developed and circulate between online sources, and news outlets including newspapers of record such as the New York Times and the Guardian as well as local and regional papers. These discourses were first identified through the thematic coding described above, and analysed in terms of the circulation of discourses among the networked public sphere and activist communities in both cases. This analysis of circulation employs the results of Benkler et al.'s (2013) analysis for the debates around SOPA, and six original interviews with members of the digital rights organizations campaigning against ACTA 1 for that case. Together, this analysis of discourse and its contexts helps to show how discursive participation in policy-making unfolds in contemporary mediated culture (see Dunbar-Hester, 2013; Streeter, 1996) .
The analysis identifies how the discourse of networked exceptionalism developed within expert commentary and then expanded, in part through the 'internet blackout' meme, which embedded contradictory interpretations about the internet's fragility and indispensability that were a feature of the discourse. These interpretations emerged within media narratives and circulated through the meme and through symbolic 'technical activist' actions such as blackouts and DDoS. In these actions, the network becomes a structural platform for the circulation of discourse but also an aspect of that discourse (see Kelty, 2005) .
Civic participation in constructing such discourses is only a small part of the way that policymaking unfolds. In both SOPA and ACTA mobilizations, discourses reveal and conceal the significant and ongoing efforts of a number of actors including technology companies like Google, mandate-based advocacy organizations like Public Knowledge and Access Now, as well as online media, technology news websites, online platforms and other online actors. Opposition to SOPA and ACTA included a number of traditional tools for policy change including lobbying and petition and street protest as well as networked propagation of information through online media and online activist tactics. These networked actions not only create and propagate discourse, but also create actions that are later represented in that discourse. This dynamic carries ideas from activist networks to the mass media, establishing some ambivalent relationships.
SOPA: development and propagation of discourse Vulnerable and victimized internet
Before the coordinated efforts connected with the 'blackout' in January 2012, organized opposition to SOPA received little press coverage in mainstream media outlets. News and information about the significance of SOPA moved across blogs, message boards and websites linked with digital advocacy organizations long before it gained any purchase in news sites with broader readerships (Benkler et al., 2013) . Within these spaces, significant discourses emerged, notably a discourse of a fragile or vulnerable internet. References to 'breaking the internet' appear in several blogs that became key nodes in the discussion as analysed by Benkler's team. For example, a report by Lemley, Levine, and Post (2011) and excerpted on several blogs positions the internet as a victim of violent enforcement, subject to 'an unprecedented, legally sanctioned assault' (p. 1) with the power of the courts directed to internet infrastructure in 'sledgehammer fashion'. The internet itself is described as a fragile entity susceptible not only to threat but also illness in relation to the regulatory experience: SOPA and PIPA introduce 'infirmities' that are 'built upon' particularly by SOPA. The internet's integrity is under threat:
The Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) is a foundational block upon which the Internet has been built and upon which its continued functioning critically depends; it is among a handful of protocols upon which almost every other protocol, and countless Internet applications, rely to operate smoothly.
The kinds of illnesses and threats introduced to the internet undermine these foundations. The 'fragile' or 'ill' internet cannot thus fulfil its potential as a foundation for commerce and communication. Notions of fragility and indispensability thread through the activist efforts at resisting SOPA, and through reports on these actions.
Blackout: vulnerability and indispensability
Through the dissemination of the idea of an 'internet blackout', a discourse of vulnerability and indispensability emerged, tied to the idea that defence of the internet was essential. On Wikipedia, founder Jimmy Wales floated the notion of English Wikipedia going 'on strike'. After a community consultation and a vote, the Wikipedia community agreed to join other blackout actions on 18 January. This participation garnered lots of attention: the Wikimedia foundation reports that there were over 162 million visits to the blacked-out site on the 18th, and between the community's decision to join the blackout on 16 January and 18 January, every single one of the indexed news articles included mention of Wikipedia's participation. The support of Wikipedia was thus significant in underlining the threat of SOPA to the fragile internet. This was mirrored in a shift in the arguments legitimating participation in the blackout by Wikipedians (Oz, 2012) , which moved from descriptions of individual opposition to SOPA but then shifted after some members argued that such political action contravened the Wikipedia project's neutral point of view.
Instead of arguing that opposing SOPA was good or beneficial, they argued that it was essential. We can trace a new line of arguments, according to which SOPA puts at jeopardy the very existence of Wikipedia, and therefore the community has no option but to disregard its own policies and norms in order to save the project. (Oz, 2012, para. 4) The discussion among Wikipedia participants about whether to participate in the blackout thus had to account for the legitimacy of a neutral encyclopaedia participating in a political project (Oz, 2012) . The legitimacy could only be secured by presenting SOPA as a key threat to the project. Wikipedia thus becomes the exemplar of the fragile internet, in need of both protection and defence. As well, the internet 'blackout' developed as a meme that carried and developed the discourse of networked exceptionalism.
The blackout meme
Wiggins and Bowers define memes as 'remixed, iterated messages which are rapidly spread by members of participatory digital culture for the purpose of continuing a conversation' (2014, p. 1). In the development of discourses around SOPA activism, the notion of an 'internet blackout' took on the qualities of a meme, permitting not only the conversation about the legislation to continue, but also its particularly resonant discourse. The idea of an internet 'blackout' originated in discussions between advocates who had drafted open letters opposing the legislation: the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Amnesty International and dozens of others. Once the notion of a 'strike' by the creators of internet content took hold, it could be adopted, iterated and shared. Discussing a 'blackout' not only highlighted the significance of user-generated content on the internet, but also provided a framework for political action and connection to broader concerns about the future of the internet and digital rights. Structurally, design of 'blacked-out' sites provided ways for visitors to Wikipedia or Google to be directed to online petitions or to information on how to contact their elected representatives. The propagation of the 'blackout' as a meme was bolstered by opportunities for individuals to feel part of the protest -even when these opportunities meant that sites were not actually rendered inaccessible (as was the case for Google's landing page, e.g.). Considering the blackout as a meme highlights how networked dynamics can carry an idea -even the nub of a discourse -in ways that allow it to develop. Hundreds of thousands of individuals participated in propagating a notion of a fragile yet essential internet, through posting 1 of the estimated 2.5 million tweets tagged with #SOPA, changing a Facebook status to an anti-SOPA 'censored' message, blacking out an individual blog (Wordpress reported that 25,000 individual blogs were dark on 18 January), or using tools like the Flickr button that made it possible to symbolically 'censors' any image in the repository. This symbolic propagation of the 'blackout' meme provided the hinge of a new narrative for protest that was also reflected in media coverage of anti-SOPA activities.
This coverage used the notion of the blackout to develop the idea that this mobilization was unique because it came from and represented the internet: journalists quoted the Central Operating Officer of Reddit commenting that the participation in the action was 'testament to how the internet works' (USA TODAY, 2012). The number of references to 'blackouts' suggested that the social media buzz signified something important. For example, the LA Times reported that 'internet companies have broadened the debate, recasting it from one about piracy and digital copyright protection to one about Internet Freedom' (Chang & Hsu, 2012) . The broadening debate includes references to terror and anxiety about the possibility that the internet might not work as expected, and reveals tensions in how people understand and talk about the internet:
The prospect of a day without the websites set off a frenzy in the hours leading up to the strike, which was slated to begin Tuesday night, with parents urging their children to do their homework early and tech-savvy users posting instructions for how to access cached Wikipedia pages during the blackout. 'If Wikipedia is going down, I'm going down with it,' wrote Twitter user Mariellesmind, who was among thousands that filled the microblogging site with panicked, profanity-filled tweets. 'Terrified about the Wikipedia outage,' tweeted Los Angeles resident Chandra Moore. 'I was told to use an encyclopedia if I have a question, but I won't even be able to Wiki what one is.' The Internet's biggest power players, including Google, Facebook and YouTube, were planning to stay up and running, but the shutdown of the other sites and the ensuing anxiety underscored the breadth and influence of the world's Internet companies, as well as Americans' dependence on them. (Chang & Hsu, 2012) The frenzy and anxiety about the possibility of limitations to the internet are contrasted with the power of the internet players, and hence, the legitimation of their calls for freedom -which, given that a vote on SOPA had already been postponed, and support withdrawn by the White House, were more important as general statements of purpose rather than specific policy statements.
Anonymous: too threatening to legitimate
If the terror of life without Wikipedia introduced some ambivalence about the role of the internet, Anonymous produced even more. Anons contributed to SOPA discourses and practices but claimed no participation in 'blackout' protests nor directly linked with their coverage in the media. However, Anonymous did undertake a DDoS action, purportedly in response to SOPA as well as to the pre-emptive arrest of Kim Dotcom and the shutdown of cyberlocker site MegaUpload, which was well known for video sharing. Targets included Universal Music, the FBI, the US Copyright Office and the Recording Industry Association of America. The action was typically, ambivalently Anonymous: not explicitly political, mixing perceived threats to free speech with criticism of limited access to online video. The mass media struggled to position Anonymous within the discursive space of threat and 'blackout': the Philadelphia Inquirer reported, 'for cyberhacker group Anonymous Wednesday [18 January] will be a day of rest' (Timpane, 2012) . To retain legitimacy, the discourse of network exceptionalism within the SOPA protests had to focus on the potential to protect the fragile internet. Too much attention to Anonymous might draw attention elsewhere, to the threatening and unknowable aspect of network exceptionalism. Perhaps because the production and circulation of this galvanizing discourse occurred in parallel with lobbying of legislators by corporations including Google, certain aspects of its power are minimized. While a similar discourse animated the end of the campaign to oppose ACTA (in particular through references to internet freedom), it retained a greater ambivalence especially in relation to the figure of Anonymous.
ACTA activism: the opportunity to use SOPA activist frames Just after the SOPA strike, digital rights organizations across Europe including La Quadrature du Net in France, Bits of Freedom in the Netherlands and a European branch of Access Now were organizing a final phase of their opposition to ACTA in concert with other groups. As one advocate involved with Access Now remembers, We had been trying for months … And the thing is that we couldn't get citizens engaged because it was an esoteric kind of agreement and it was being negotiated completely in secret so we had no real access to documents, we were working with leaks. The media wasn't touching it, it was not a hot topic, there was no hook. (Anonymous, 2013 , personal interview, November 12, 2013 But the response to SOPA changed public sentiment:
We had started a petition in August, and from August to 22 January, we had gathered something like 11,000 signatures. But in two days, it was on Twitter, it just exploded. It was right after SOPA PIPA and people found out about ACTA and they just started going crazy. Within two days we had like 380,000 signatures on our petition. (Anonymous, 2013 , personal interview, November 12, 2013 The ACTA campaigners used discourses of networked exceptionalism to highlight the work they were doing and its connection to the activism in the United States. This discourse leveraged the same kinds of direct policy action as the anti-SOPA action. A post on Reddit by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Marietje Schaake illustrates how aspects of the discourse employed in SOPA, including the blackout meme, reappear in relation to ACTA:
The internet blackouts by thousands of websites last week in protest of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) have raised lively discussions. Not only in the US but also in the EU the question is how to balance or reform copyright laws whilst preserving an open internet. The success of the protests against SOPA and PIPA has also given the internet community quite a confidence boost.
If you are concerned about ACTA, contact MEPs (from your country of political party), especially targeting the ones who are in the committees who will vote on ACTA in the coming months. You can find their email addresses on the EP website. Perhaps it would not have to come to a blackout! (Schaake, 2012 ).
Schaake's message employs the blackout as evidence that the 'internet community' is effective in creating policy change, but also mentions 'massive protests'. It highlights the exceptional quality of the 'blackout', framing it as a last resort in the final sentence of the message. This suggests that even though the success of the blackout supported the more traditional activist activities, blackouts should not be expected to happen all the time. Schaake's note thus hints at a different kind of ambivalence born out of the same tension between the dangerously powerful and dangerously fragile internet. However, although this discourse draws from the SOPA protests evocations of the internet as a space of freedom, it also draws into question the legitimacy of protest online as compared to physical protest.
Press positioning
In the weeks between the 'blackout' actions in the United States and a European 'day of action' in February 2012, the European press used references to SOPA to position the significance of ACTA. In this period reports included comparisons to SOPA as a way of signifying the importance of the internet for collective action: 'European activists who participated in American internet protests last month learned that there was political power to be harnessed on the web' (International Herald Tribune, 6 February 2012) . The Prague Post referred to the planned day of action as the 'latest flashpoint' (7 February 2012) and the Agence France-Presse newswire reported, 'for young people who lack much chance of climbing the social ladder, the Internet is one of the last public arenas where they feel free' (Relaxnews, 9 February 2012) .
Alongside this presentation of the internet as a symbolic space of freedom, the press also presented the internet in general and internet activism in particular as a vaguely threatening space.
Even after popular press articles ceased referring to SOPA and the blackout actions to contextualize ACTA, they continued to refer to internet activism as a special case of collective action: 'The real and virtual campaigns, mustered on online social networks, kicked off ahead of the 26 January signature in Tokyo of ACTA by Poland and 21 other European governments' (Relaxnews, 2012) . Journalists made frequent references to Anonymous, sometimes as a means of discrediting the online movement. Coverage of public protests referred to participants wearing Guy Fawkes masks, associated with Anonymous. The powerful and unknowable internet was also evoked through references to the Pirate party, which claimed responsibility for organizing street protests. These references highlighted the unexpected appearance of this party in European politics, marginal and also newly legitimate. Opponents to ACTA were also frequently described as both young and 'digitally savvy' or technically literate.
According to interviewees, this positioning of the opponents as primarily concerned with digital rights (and primarily young) fed in to arguments from ACTA supporters that the anti-ACTA campaign was based on misinformation fed to naïve street protesters. The presumption was that the young protesters were not knowledgeable, when background interviews identified that networked coordination and information sharing were significant in the ACTA campaign.
The press never referred to these aspects in their coverage, in contrast to press reports on SOPA action. Instead, references to Anonymous and disruptive cyber-activism appeared more frequently, framing online collective action as exceptional and threatening. For example, an editorial in the Guardian read, 'strategies that work are ones that are collaborative and seek to persuade. Bombing down websites may produce a temporary result … but such antics feed into government's desire for an arms race' (Brooke, 2012) . This extract illustrates how the exceptional quality of networked protest (at least structurally) is positioned as having questionable legitimacy.
In contrast to the questions of legitimacy that emerged in relation to SOPA, where legitimacy was associated with protection of the internet from threat, legitimacy in relation to ACTA was more strongly connected with ideas of physical protest. Attention by the press to physical protest, or the 'media logic of numbers ' (Della Porta & Diani, 1999 ) provided a conventional frame through which to understand both the activism and the activists that was less destabilizing than discourses that highlighted the exceptional quality of the network. Coverage of the February 2012 day of action, for example, framed the importance of the protest by describing and photographing the large numbers of protesters and highlighting the exceptionally cold weather on the days of the protests. Interviews reiterated how the visibility of people on the street and the direct contact between citizens and their elected representatives had much more traction and influence among the media and campaigners than references to action online. However, in reports on the 4 July vote, references to citizen action and decentralized coordination reappear. The Prague Post called the vote 'democracy's victory' and notes that 'the internet is increasingly a format for the defense and regulation of human rights and civil liberties' (Greene, 2012) . A Guardian 'Comment is Free' editorial proclaimed 'ACTA was a victim of the social internet' noting that the participation of Anonymous as well as the online organizing of a 'social crowd' was able to force the European parliament to act accountably (Arthur, 2012) .
More than in the SOPA protest, Anonymous was a significant cultural force associated with ACTA opposition: besides distributing videos, Anonymous claimed responsibility for hacking US government websites in February 2012 as part of the anti-ACTA protests. The anti-ACTA statement posted on the sites purportedly read:
If ACTA is signed by all participating negotiating countries, you can rest assured that Antisec (an Anonymous hacking association) will bring a fucking mega-uber-awesome war that rain torrential hellfire down on all enemies of free speech, privacy and internet freedom. We will systematically knock all evil corporations and governments off of our internet. (cited in Cheredar, 2012) The typical Anonymous meme-laden language in this posting provides a mysterious and somewhat threatening message that resonated in the online technology news contexts like the site it is quoted in. It manages to evoke both the significance of the protests but also their peculiar constituencies.
Discursively, the vague threat and power of the network symbolized by Anonymous carried through other forms of protest against ACTA. The symbolism of Anonymous (and by extension a particular strand of digital rights protest) was adopted to symbolically identify connection with digital rights movements: Polish MEPs indicated their opposition to the bill by appearing in the European Parliament holding paper Guy Fawkes masks. Yet as effective as this symbolism of internet threat might have been, it also had unfortunate consequences for activists: one of my interviewees remembers an MEP confronted with thousands of emails in his inbox referring to these messages as 'cyber-terrorism'. Discourses of network exceptionalism can therefore also discredit technical activism or 'argument-by-technology'.
Discussion
Networks operate functionally to disseminate ideas and link together people participating in social action (e.g. by embedding aspects of discourse in memes, which then propagate ideas swiftly), but also symbolically, inflecting discourses towards a focus on the exceptional -and essential -qualities of the internet. The analysis of discourses of 'network exceptionalism' created during SOPA and ACTA protest identifies how, even amidst successful public mobilizations that manage to capture the significance of internet architecture for free speech, the internet's exceptional qualities are ambivalent. On the one hand its fragility requires protection, but on the other it seems able to create the vaguely threatening culture of Anonymous. Within both SOPA and ACTA campaigns, the notion of the internet as exceptional operated both structurally and symbolically, with great expectations related to the capacity of the internet to liberate, as well as great concern about its shadier side. This meant that the success of these efforts was integrated into processes that legitimated both discourse and practice: the transfer of 'blackout' memes during SOPA, and the linking of online cultures like Anonymous to physical protest during ACTA. However, the dual nature of this discourse renders it ambivalent.
This ambivalence may create risks for advocates seeking to define and protect rights in the digital era: the internet's unknowable threats combine with its weakness to threat from law or state power. This reinforces attempts to protect and control the internet through code or legislation. This may provide one way of understanding the seemingly muted public response to Edward Snowden's revelations of systemic surveillance of internet communications. Discourses that present the internet as fragile and threatening position any defence of its exceptionalism as weak or suspect. Overstating the exceptional nature of networked communication may also result in a weakening of legitimate claims for freedom of expression on the internet. As well, it is important to identify how quickly these dominant discourses absorb opposition movements by positioning them within long-established frames focused on numbers of protesters and expected protest actions. That there was such a large participation of individuals in legitimate discursive policy-making actions (as opposed to less legitimate ones like Anonymous DDoS and other actions) testifies to the significance of SOPA and ACTA, but also to the risk that future protest movements of this type will have their discourses captured from the beginning.
Conclusion
Structurally, networks permit a novel dynamic of information sharing and conversation (see Benkler, et al., 2013) , including the embedding of aspects of discourse into a meme.
Symbolically, the internet is represented both as exceptional modes of organizing and as an exceptional platform for communication. In the United States and in Europe, this discourse contributed in different ways to participation in policy-making. In the United States, the combination of fragility and indispensability legitimated action by individuals as well as collectives. In Europe, by contrast, discourses in the press constructed legitimacy in relation to other forms of civic action like street protest, and included a darker, more threatening nuance in relation to networked exceptionalism.
Undoubtedly, discourses of network exceptionalism are powerful: they link in to the capacity of the internet to enact forms of civil disobedience and 'argument-by-technology'. Yet this paper has revealed how these discourses can be linked to other kinds of expectations about how to advocate for digital rights. The variable ways that Anonymous was identified in relation to the SOPA and ACTA actions, for example, illustrate the extent to which the internet's exceptional qualities are also threatening. This threat might need to be minimized or avoided in order to align with the interests of more powerful actors (technology companies lobbying against SOPA, e.g.) or it may be leveraged to undermine the legitimacy of digital rights activism, as is evident in the elision of networked protest and 'cyber-terrorism'.
Digital rights advocacy and its scholarship have invested in notions of the internet as an exceptional platform for communication and coordination, and specifically in the notion of protecting this exceptional quality from threat. But as this paper reveals, this might be risky. The idea of an exceptional internet might be too ambivalent -too easy to capture or reposition. It might seem too threatening and provoke a promise of greater securitization by governing states. Perhaps the internet is now too essential to be regarded as exceptional. In any case, as these examples have shown, not only have the methods of activism changed, their content has changed as well. How this change will continue remains to be seen.
